



with China and the USA after 2012
Cost reduction through emissions trading
and technological cooperation
Claudia Kemfert
Greenhouse gas emissions should be stabilized to today's level to prevent
harmful climate damage.The countries that have signed the Kyoto Protocol
committed themselves to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions over the
period 2008 to 2012, but only to a very limited extent. The USA decided not
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol for various reasons. Furthermore, fast-growing
economies like China are about to catch up with the USA in terms of their
energy consumption and gas emissions. Therefore, in the near future it is
going to be essential to try and persuade both nations, the USA and China,
to accept binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. The USA and
China need to be convinced to enter a 'Kyoto Plus' Agreement after 2012.
In this respect, a clearly defined international trade in emission rights
can play an important role. In the industrialized countries, costs of approx.
500 billion US dollars could be avoided until 2050 as compared with a sce-
nario in which there is no emissions trading. In order to lower expenses to
this extent, Europe, the USA, Japan and Russia need to reduce their emis-
sions by 3% per year from 2012 onwards as compared with an estimated
emission curve according to a 'business as usual' scenario, and moreover,
simultaneously China needs to be granted emissions rights after 2012. On
the one hand, this would help industrialized countries like the USA to effec-
tively reduce emission reductions costs. On the other hand, China could ben-
efit to a large extent from selling emission rights. Moreover, additional
incentives to meet climate protection targets could be created through spe-
cific cooperation when investing in new technologies.
How to proceed after Kyoto?
Greenhouse gas emissions and thus greenhouse gas concentrations have
constantly increased over the past centuries.1 The Intergovernmental Panel
of Climate Change (IPCC) and the German Advisory Council on Global
Change (WBGU) assume that a rise in the global carbon dioxide concentra-
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perature increase by more than 2°C until 2100 _ would
constitute a harmful human impact on the climate.
Current carbon dioxide concentrations already reach
approx. 400 ppm.2 The main emitters of greenhouse
gases are industrialized countries with a high per capita
energy consumption, e.g. the USA, the EU countries and
Japan. Moreover, China has become the 2nd largest emit-
ter of CO2 world-wide due to its energy-intensive
growth. With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol,
most industrialized countries have committed them-
selves to a reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions
over the period 2008 to 2012.
However, efforts for an effective and internationally
agreed climate protection have been sluggish, and it
appears doubtful whether binding emission targets will
be actually set for the time after the expiry of the Kyoto
Protocol's first commitment period in 2012. While Ger-
many and the European Union insist on binding com-
mitments and have already implemented numerous cli-
mate protection measures themselves, other countries
like the USA and China have refused to meet these
demands.3 This contrasts the urgent need for a partici-
pation of the USA in international climate protection
which could help persuade countries like China and
India to take action as well.
Nations with high emissions and often high abate-
ment costs will in the medium or long run only join a cli-
mate protection agreement if cooperation in interna-
tional climate protection yields a low-cost option to
achieve emission targets. In this respect, various incen-
tives could be used. Countries could be persuaded to
commit to climate protection goals using Side Payments,
i.e. cash payments e.g. from climate protection funds4
specifically set up for that purpose. There could be
financial support for concrete climate protection mea-
sures. Moreover, forerunner states like the European
countries could put pressure on hesitating nations to
sign a climate protection agreement by imposing restric-
tions on trade, in particularly climate-damaging energy
sources (e.g. for coal from the USA). However, quantita-
tive investigations have shown that this would have
negative economic effects for the countries suffering
from trade restrictions as well as for those countries
imposing them.5
It seems more promising to introduce at the interna-
tional level those emission reduction measures which
cause minimal economic costs. Industrialized countries'
abatement costs can be significantly reduced through
emissions trading compared to other climate protection
instruments. This also applies to other countries that
would like to contribute to an international climate pro-
tection. Moreover, countries could cooperate on techno-
logical innovation in order to improve energy efficiency
and to bring about additional reductions in abatement
costs. This could create a competitive advantage for the
participating countries.6
Thus, the success of climate protection policies after
2012 depends on three factors: concrete global emission
reduction targets, cooperation and cost efficiency.
Cost reduction through emissions 
trading – three scenarios
The trade in emission rights already included in the
Kyoto Protocol significantly reduces emission mitiga-
tion costs.7 This is primarily due to the fact that Rus-
sia's emissions, following the economic slump after
1990, lie much below the 1990 level. Thus, Russia could
sell emissions rights in the commitment period.8 For
countries with relatively high abatement costs, e.g. the
EU countries and Japan, it can be less costly to buy
emission rights instead of implementing emission reduc-
tion measures in their countries.
For further climate protection after Kyoto, i.e. after
2012, it will be decisive that additional emissions reduc-
1  Cf. Hans-Joachim Ziesing: 'Worldwide Climate Protection Policy _
Still No Visible Success.' In: DIW Economic Bulletin, vol. 41, no. 10,
October 2004; Hans-Joachim Ziesing and Franz Wittke: 'Primärener-
gieverbrauch in Deutschland von hohen Energiepreissteigerungen und
konjunktureller Belebung geprägt'. In: Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin,
no. 7/2005; Hans-Joachim Ziesing: 'Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Ger-
many _ Stagnating in 2004.' In: DIW Berlin Weekly Report, no. 9/2005.
2  Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC): 'Climate Change
2001. Third Assessment Report.' Synthesis Report: Cambridge 2001;
Claudia Kemfert: 'Global Protection of Climate _ Immediate Action
Will Avert High Costs.' In: DIW Berlin Weekly Report, no. 12/2005.
3  However, it should be noted that a number of US Federal States have
already implemented ambitious climate protection goals. In China an
energy efficiency increase can be observed.
4  Carl Christian von Weizsäcker suggested that emission rights of
10 euros per tonne of carbon dioxide be purchased and deposited into
a climate protection fund; cf. Carl Christian von Weizsäcker: 'Was
kommt nach 'Kyoto'?' In: Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, no. 12,
2004, p. 782-786.
5  Cf. Claudia Kemfert: 'International Climate Coalitions and Trade _
Assessment of Cooperation Incentives by Issue Linkage.' In: Energy
Policy, no. 4, p. 455-465; Susanne Dröge and Claudia Kemfert: 'Trade
Policy to Control Climate Change: Does the Stick Beat the Carrot?' In:
DIW Berlin Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, vol. 74, no. 2,
2005, p. 235-248.
6  Ibidem
7  Claudia Kemfert: 'Global Climate Protection ...' op. cit.; Claudia
Kemfert: 'The Economic Costs of Climatic Change.' In: DIW Berlin
Weekly Report, no. 2/2005; Christian van Hirschhausen, Franziska
Holz and Claudia Kemfert: 'Russian Energy and Climate Policy
Remains Inconsistent _ Challenges for the EU'. In: DIW Berlin Weekly
Report, no. 11/2005.
8  This leads to the so-called 'Hot Air' problem, i.e. Russia can sell
excess emissions rights and achieve significant revenue.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 23/2005  275
tions can be achieved at the lowest possible cost. 'Kyoto
Plus' must include three important features:
1. Binding emission reduction targets for all industrial-
ized countries
2. Cost efficiency through an international emissions
trading that includes fast-growing economies
3. Cooperation in technological research
Three simulated scenarios are described below. The
first one is based on the assumption that after 2012 only
the industrialized countries Europe, Japan, Russia and
also the USA will commit themselves to emission reduc-
tions of 3% per year as compared with the estimated
emission curve in the 'business as usual' scenario (cf.
table) until 2050 (scenario I). This would not be enough
to avert climate change, yet would mean much higher
emission reductions than in the years after expiry of the
Kyoto Protocol, and would be a politically achievable
goal, especially for the USA. All the more so since the
USA had already announced in 2002 that it is striving to
substantially increase energy efficiency and to uncouple
economic growth from energy consumption.9 This sce-
nario would yield a total reduction of 10 gigatonnes of
carbon dioxide (cf. figure) in the industrialized countries
until 2050. Economic costs are estimated using the WIA-
GEM global simulation model.10 It is also assumed that
Russia will grow strongly and will demand emissions
certificates after 2012. If industrial countries were to
reach the emission reductions targets by 2050, this
would entail total costs of approx. 1 billion US dollar.
The emissions certificate price would reach US $ 51 per
tonne of carbon dioxide.
In the second scenario it is assumed that China will
be granted emission rights amounting to the estimated
emissions from 2020 onwards (scenario II). It is further
assumed that China can reduce energy intensity by 1%
per year through technological improvements and effi-
ciency increases and, thus, can sell emission rights. In a
third scenario, it is assumed that all other developing
countries, such as India, South America and Africa, will
be granted emission rights according to the estimated
development of their emissions. Then, these countries
can also trade emission rights (scenario III). This is also
based on estimated energy efficiency increases of 1%
per year.
The costs of the industrialized countries are calcu-
lated as difference between the potential growth paths
of the gross national product (GNP). In addition, emis-
sions certificate prices are compared. 
A climate protection policy with trade in emission
rights among the industrialized countries would entail
costs amounting to approx. 1 billion US dollars until
2050 (this corresponds to 0.31% of the GNP of industri-
alized countries).11
9  In 2002, the USA announced a reduction of carbon intensity (carbon
emissions per unit of GNP) by 18%, which represents a reduction of
1.96% per year (cf. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/cli-
matechange.html).
10  Claudia Kemfert: 'The Economic Costs of Climate Change,' op. cit.;
Claudia Kemfert: 'Global Climate Protection', op. cit.
Table
Emissions Reduction Costs for Industrialized 
Countries, 2012 to 2050
In billion US dollars











(Scenario I) (Scenario II) (Scenario III)
Total 995.55  736.71  497.77
Prevented costs  258.84  497.77
of which: Europe  103.54  199.11
Memo item:
Certificate price 
in US dollar/t CO2 51 37 25
Sources: Simulation with WIAGEM model; DIW Berlin calculations.
Figure
Emissions Curve
In gigatonnes of carbon dioxide
1 Business as usual. — 2 By 3% annually as compared to BAU.
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If China joins the emissions trading, industrialized
countries could be able to avoid costs amounting to
259 billion US dollars. Furthermore, if other developing
countries participate, costs amounting to approx.
500 billion US dollars could be saved. The emissions cer-
tificate price would fall from US $ 51/t CO2 to US $ 37 or
even US $ 25/t CO2. An additional effect would be that
developing countries could realize significant revenue
through the sale of emissions rights, which would entail
additional economic growth by 0.1 percent.
Cost reduction through cooperation 
and technical innovations
Avoiding climate change is only possible if the green-
house gas emissions remain at today's levels. The IPCC
assumes that the necessary technologies to achieve this
goal already exist, but that they need to be used in a
more purposeful manner.12 The WBGU argues in a simi-
lar way and emphasizes that a significant share of
renewable energies must be used in the future.13
Currently, there are many technological options for
emission reduction, as also listed by Princeton scien-
tists.14 Efficiency improvements in energy production as
well as in transport and in housing play a major role.
Moreover, the authors consider to replace coal-fired
power plants with gas, wind, nuclear and solar power
plants and additionally to use Capture Carbon and
Sequestration (CCS).15 In addition, biomass use for
power generation could be increased and the absorption
of carbon from the atmosphere could be raised through
better forest management.
H o w e v e r ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  i t  i s  c r u c i a l  f o r
both, the use of existing technologies and the develop-
ment of new technologies to set specific emission targets
as early as possible. If the necessary climate protection
goals are set too late, this may entail significant misdi-
rected investments which, as 'stranded investments',
may lead to economic losses. Replacement investments
amounting to 60 billion euros are due over the next two
decades regarding energy generation in Germany; in
Europe, they could amount to 350 billion euros. Large
misdirected investments must be avoided in the course
of this replacement investment cycle.
If, for instance, the emissions trading price increases
to over 30 euros per tonne of carbon dioxide, the power
generation with CO2 capture and sequestration could be
more profitable in the long term as compared to tradi-
tional fossil energy production. A rising shortage of con-
ventional oil and gas reserves could lead to significant
price increases for both raw materials over the next two
decades, which would allow low emissions technologies
to rapidly become cost effective.
In addition, specific technological development coop-
erations could create incentives to join a climate protec-
tion agreement. This would be especially important for
fast-growing economies like China and India.
Summary
A long-term effective climate protection policy must pre-
scribe binding climate goals and ensure cost efficiency.
The USA and China must be involved in a 'Kyoto Plus'
Agreement after 2012. However, the USA will only join
an agreement if emission reductions are cost effective
and if fast-growing economies like China also cooperate.
Provided that the EU countries, the USA and Japan
agree upon an annual emission reduction of 3% until
2050 and that China is granted emissions rights amount-
ing to its estimated future 'business as usual' emissions,
the emission reduction cost can be reduced up to 500 bil-
lion US dollars.
Thus, cost efficiency for industrialized countries
could be substantially improved through China's
involvement. Additional incentives to participate in a
'Kyoto Plus' Agreement could result from technological
cooperation.
In the long run, the objective is certainly to achieve
higher emissions reduction targets. In the medium-term,
however, an effective global climate protection could
definitely be achieved by involving countries that are
concerned about their economic power (USA) through
international trade in emission rights, thus creating an
incentive for fast-growing economies like China to par-
ticipate in an international climate protection agreement.
11  Measured in real values of year 2000.
12  Cf. IPCC: Mitigation. A Report of Working Group III of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change. Accra, Ghana, February 28 to
March 3, 2001.
13   Cf. WBGU: 'World in Transition _ Towards Sustainable Energy
Use'. Berlin 2003, p. 94-98
14  Cf. Steve Pacala and Robert Scolow: 'Stabilization Wedges: Solving
the Climate Problem for the next 50 Years with Current Technologies.'
In: Science, vol. 305, S. 968-972.
15  Cf. Claudia Kemfert and Katja Schumacher: 'Climate Protection in
the German Electricity Market: Opportunities for Coal Technologies
Through CO2 Capture and Storage?' In: DIW Weekly Report, no. 16/
2005.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 23/2005  277
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